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Abstract 
This paper examines the emergence of manufacturing in developing countries in the period 
1950-2005. It presents new data on structural change in a sample of 63 developing countries and 
16 advanced economies. Industrialisation is seen as a single global process of structural change, 
in which separate countries follow different paths depending on their initial conditions and 
moment of their entry into the industrial race. With a few important exceptions such as Mexico, 
Brazil, India and China, developing countries embarked on industrialisation after 1945. The 
paper argues that successful catch up in developing countries is associated with 
industrialisation. It examines the theoretical and empirical for the thesis that industrialisation 
acts as an engine of growth and  attempts to quantify different aspects of this debate. 
 The statistical evidence is not straightforward. Manufacturing has been important for growth 
in developing countries, but not all expectations of the engine of growth hypothesis are borne out 
by the data. The more general historical evidence provides more support for the industrialisation 
thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Structural Change, Manufacturing, Engine of Growth, Catch Up 
JEL CODES: O14, Industrialisation, Manufacturing and Service Industries; N6, Manufacturing 
and Construction 
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1: Introduction 
Major technological breakthroughs in textile production and the application of steam power to 
production in Great Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century made a deep impression 
on contemporary and later observers. In the nineteenth century the term industrial revolution was 
coined to describe these changes in retrospect.  
 In many respects the term industrial revolution is misleading. It disregards the incremental 
nature of increases in productive capacity, the continuity with earlier developments in Northwest 
Europe in particular in the Low Countries and the importance of developments in other sectors of 
the economy. Also, the acceleration of British productivity growth only started in the early 19th 
century, rather than in the eighteenth century. (Maddison, 1982, 2007; Crafts, 1983). In other 
respects, industrial revolution remains an apt term. It captures the introduction of radically new 
production technologies which have fundamentally affected the nature of global production. The 
emergence of modern manufacturing had led tot dramatic changes in the structure of the world 
economy and to sustained increases in the growth of labour productivity and economic welfare 
(Maddison, 2001, 2007). 
 Great Britain was the first industrialiser and it became the technological leader in the world 
economy. It was the exemplar for other countries. Manufacturing became the main engine of 
accelerating economic growth in the 19th century. A global race for industrialisation had begun.  
 Industrialisation should be seen as a single global process, in which individual countries 
follow different paths depending on their initial conditions and moment of their entry into the 
race (Pollard, 1990). The first industrial followers were European countries such as Belgium, 
Switzerland and France. Between 1815 and 1850, Belgium faithfully copied the English pattern 
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of industrialisation based on coal mining, engineering and textiles. It profited from rich mineral 
resources in the South of the country.1. Switzerland was a landlocked economy with no coal, iron 
or mineral resources and a limited internal market. It successfully concentrated on 
technologically advanced products such as fine silks, embroidery and watch making. France 
followed the British model, with typical variations based on its own initial conditions. It focused 
more on high quality and luxury goods than Britain, made more use of its artisanal and artistic 
skills and at the same time exploited its cheaper labour (Crafts, 1977; Bergier, 1983; Pollard, 
1990; Von Tunzelmann, 1995). 
 In the nineteenth century, the United States followed a different path towards industrialisation 
based on primary exports, abundance of land and natural resources, and scarcity of labour. 
Labour scarcity encouraged highly capital-intensive production techniques. Technology was 
taken over rapidly and creatively from the technological leader Great Britain and there was an 
inflow of skilled labour from Europe. Technological advance was labour saving. Productivity 
growth in the USA was so rapid that this country would overtake Great Britain by the end of the 
nineteenth century. The USA has retained its technological leadership ever since. 
 Famous latecomers to the process of industrialisation were Germany, Russia and Japan. As 
argued convincingly by Alexander Gerschenkron (1962), latecomers profit from the availability 
of modern technologies developed in the leading industrial economies, without bearing all the 
risks and costs involved in research and development. Gerschenkron referred to this as the 
                                                 
1
  The foundations for Belgian industrialisation were laid when Belgium was still a part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands in from 1815 till 1830. 
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‘advantages of backwardness’.2 In modern economic terminology, latecomers profit from 
international technology spillovers. They do not pay for the full costs of research and 
development embodied in imported machinery3, equipment and inputs (rent spillovers) and they 
can learn about international state knowledge and technology through copying, imitating, reverse 
engineering and scientific, professional and technological interaction (knowledge spillovers).  
 Gerschenkron reasoned that technological developments had increased the scale of industrial 
production. This required a larger scale of resource mobilisation, than before. Therefore, late 
industrialisation would either not take place or it would be very dynamic. If the conditions were 
right and economic growth took off in a late developing country, it would take the form of a 
growth spurt. Productivity growth in the late developer would be much more rapid than in the 
technological leader and the late developer would start catching up.  
 According to Gerschenkron, the role of government policy and large financial conglomerates 
was more important in late industrialisation than in early industrialisation. The self-financing of 
firms, characteristic of early industrialisation in Great Britain. was incapable of raising sufficient 
resources to match the required scale of investment. Governments and financial institutions took 
over this role. They invested directly in industries and transport infrastructure. They played a 
crucial role in the mobilisation of resources for investment and they were very active in education 
                                                 
2
  Earlier versions of this idea are to be found in the work of Veblen (1915) on Imperial Germany and the Dutch 
historian Romein (1937), who both tended to stress the disadvantages of technological leadership and its 
associated danger of lock in into technological trajectories that could become obsolete.  
3
  These costs include the costs of R&D of failed innovation projects, which did not result in commercialised 
products and processes. 
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and technology acquisition.4 Development-oriented governments set themselves the task of 
eliminating historical obstacles to industrialisation and challenging the economic, political and 
military dominance of the early industrialisers. 
 What about the developing countries? From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, the 
world economy had divided into industrial economies and agricultural economies (Arthur Lewis, 
1978 a, b; Maddison, 2001, 2007). Colonies and non-colonised countries in the tropics remained 
predominantly agrarian, while the Western world and the Asian latecomer Japan industrialised. 
Industrial growth in the West created an increasing demand for primary products from 
developing countries. Technological advances in transport, infrastructure and communication 
expanded the opportunities for trade. Thus, the colonial division of labour came into being. 
Developing countries exported primary agricultural and mining products to the advanced 
economies. Industrial economies exported their finished manufactured goods to the developing 
countries. Industrialisation became synonymous with wealth, economic development, 
technological leadership, political power and international dominance. The very concept of 
development came to be associated with industrialisation. Industrialisation was rightly seen as 
the main engine of growth and development. 
 In developing countries, moves towards industrialisation were scarce and hesitant. Towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, one finds such beginnings in Latin American countries such as 
                                                 
4
  With the wave of mergers of the eighties and nineties, the role of government in mobilisation of resources has 
became less important again. The resources of the mega-multinational companies dwarf those of many of the 
smaller national states and they are able to mobilise financial resources for very lage investment projects, without 
any public support.  
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Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico and large Asian countries such as India and China.5 But 
developing countries still remained predominantly dependent on agriculture and mining. Arthur 
Lewis has argued that the shear profitability of primary exports was one of main reasons for the 
specialisation of developing countries in primary production. But colonial policies also played a 
negative role. For instance, in India, textile manufacturing suffered severely from restrictive 
colonial policies which favoured production in Great Britain. 
 Whatever the reasons, the groundswell of global industrialisation, which started in Great 
Britain in the eighteenth century, swept through Europe and the USA and reached Japan and 
Russia by the end of the nineteenth century, subsided after 1900 (Pollard, 1990). With a few 
exceptions, developing countries were bypassed by industrialisation. The exceptions were 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil and South Africa which profited from the collapse of world 
trade in the crisis years of the 1930s to build up their own manufacturing industries, providing 
early examples of successful import substitution. In Asia, China and India experienced some 
degree of industrialisation in the late nineteenth century, but industrialisation only took off after 
these countries freed themselves from colonialism and external domination. On the whole, the 
developing world remained overwhelmingly oriented towards primary production. 
 This started to change in 1945. After a pause of fifty years developing countries rejoined the 
industrial race in the post-war period (e.g. Balance, et al., 1982). Since World War II, 
manufacturing has emerged as a major activity in many developing countries and the shape and 
structure of global manufacturing production and trade has changed fundamentally. The colonial 
                                                 
5
 Around 1750, the Indian textile industry was producing around one quarter of global textile output (e.g. Roy, 
2004). However, the basis of production was more artisanal than industrial. 
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division of labour of the late nineteenth century has been stood on its head. Large parts of 
manufacturing have relocated to developing countries which supply industrial exports to the rich 
countries. Some developing countries have experienced a process of rapid catch up which was 
invariably tied up with successful late industrialisation (Szirmai, 2008).  
 Table 1 summarises catch up experiences since the 19th century. Very rapid growth is the 
norm in catch up economies since 1950. 
Table 1: Catch Up since 1820 
Country Period
a
 
Growth 
of GDP 
Growth of 
GDP per capita 
Rate of  
Catch upb  
1820-1913     
USA 1820-1905 4.1 1.5 1.3 
Germany 1880-1913 3.1 1.9 1.8 
Russia 1900-1913 3.2 1.4 2.0 
Japan 1870-1913 2.5 1.5 1.5 
     
United Kingdom 1820-1913 2.0 1.1  
World Average 1820-1913 1.5 0.9  
     
1950-2003     
China 1978-2006 8,1 6,9 3.6 
West Germany 1950-1973 6,0 5,0 2.7 
India 1994-2006 6,7 5,1 2.4 
Indonesia 1967-1997 6,8 4,8 2.4 
Ireland 1995-2006 6,2 6,2 2.8 
Japan 1946-1973 9,3 8,0 3.6 
Korea 1952-1997 8,2 6,3 3.0 
Malaysia 1968-1997 7,5 5,1 2.6 
Russia 1998-2005 7,2 7,2 3.9 
Singapore 1960-1973 10,0 7,6 2.5 
Taiwan 1962-1973 11,4 8,7 2.8 
Thailand 1973-1996 7,6 5,8 3.2 
Vietnam 1992-2005 7,6 6,1 2.9 
    
 
World Average 1950-1973 4,9 2,9  
World Average 1973-1997 3,1 1,4  
World Average 1997-2003 3,5 2,3  
Sources: Country data 1990 and before, plus figures for world total from  Angus Maddison, Historical 
Statistics, World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2003 AD (update: August 2007) 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. Country data 1991-2006 and West Germany from: The Conference Board 
and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, November 2007, 
http://www.conference-board.org/economics" .West Germany from Conference Board/GGDC.  
Notes 
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a. The periods have been chosen so as to maximise sustained high growth rates over an extended period 
b. Ratio of Growth of GDP per capita compared to growth in lead economy in corresponding period. Prior 
to 1913, the comparison is with the UK, after 1950 with the USA 
 
Per capita growth rates of GDP in the catch up economies vary from 5 to 9 per cent per year.  
GDP growth varies from 6 to 11.5 per cent. All examples of catch-up are associated with the 
widespread and rapid emergence of manufacturing. Industrialisation seems to be a key driver of 
catch up. 
 One of the most interesting results in table 1 is the way catch up has accelerated since the 19th 
century, due to increased globalisation, greater possibilities for international technology transfer 
and increasing advantages of backwardness. In the nineteenth century, GDP per capita in the 
catch up countries was growing at between 1.4 and 1.9 per cent per year, compared to the 5-9 per 
cent after 1950. The ratio of per capita GDP growth to that of the United Kingdom in the 
corresponding years prior to 1913 was between 1.3 and 2. After 1950, the catch up countries 
were growing on average three times as fast as the world leader the USA. 
 
2: Structural Change and the Emergence of Manufacturing 
The following tables document the process of structural change in developing countries in the 
period 1950-2005. Table 2 presents shares of agriculture, industry, manufacturing and services 
for a sample of 29 larger developing countries. In 1950, 41 per cent of developing country GDP 
originated in the agricultural sector. It declined dramatically to 16 per cent in 2005. It is worth 
noting that the average share of services in the advanced economies was already 40 percent in 
1950, far higher than the total share of industry. Thus, the pattern of structural change in 
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developing countries differs radically from the traditional patterns of structural change, in which 
the rise of industry precedes that of the service sector. 
 In 1950, the share of manufacturing was only 11 per cent of GDP compared to 31 per cent in 
the OECD economies. This is low in comparative perspective, but higher than one would expect 
for countries that are just embarking on a process of industrialisation.6 The only countries which 
really had negligible shares of manufacturing were Tanzania, Zambia and Nigeria and Sri Lanka. 
Latin America is by far the most industrialised region in 1950. 
 The average share of manufacturing increases in all countries between 1950 and 1980, 
peaking at around 20 per cent in the early eighties. Between 1980 and 2005, the share of 
manufacturing continued to increase in many Asian economies, but there were processes of 
deindustrialisation in Latin America and Africa. This was most marked in Latin American 
countries where the share of manufacturing declined from 24 to 18 percent on average. In the 
OECD economies, the share of manufacturing declined substantially from 31 percent in 1945 to 
17 percent in 2005. The most important sector in 2005 is the service sector, accounting for 
around 70 per cent of GDP, up from 43 per cent in 1950. 
 In comparative perspective we observe a long-run increase in the shares of manufacturing in 
developing countries and a long run contraction in the shares of manufacturing in the advanced 
economies. By 2005, the average share of manufacturing in the developing world is somewhat 
higher than in the advanced economies.  
                                                 
6
 It is possible that the early national accounts for developing countries focus on the formal sector and thus will 
exaggerate the share of manufacturing,. They tend to underestimate informal activities and the agricultural sectors, 
even though several of the national account present estimates of the non-monetary sectors. 
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Table 2: Structure of Production, 1950-2005 
(Gross value added in agriculture, industry and services as percentage of GDP at current prices, 
29 countries) 
  
1950 (a) 1960 (b) 1980 2005 (c) 
  AG IND MAN SERV AG IND MAN SERV AG IND MAN SERV AG IND MAN SERV 
Bangladesh d 61 7 7 32 57 7 5 36 32 21 14 48 20 27 17 53 
China 51 21 14 29 39 32 27 29 30 49 40 21 13 48 34 40 
India 55 14 10 31 43 20 14 38 36 25 17 40 18 28 16 54 
Indonesia 58 9 7 33 51 15 9 33 24 42 13 34 13 47 28 40 
Malaysia 40 19 11 41 35 20 8 46 23 41 22 36 8 50 30 42 
Pakistan 61 7 7 32 46 16 12 38 30 25 16 46 21 27 19 51 
Philippines 42 17 8 41 26 28 20 47 25 39 26 36 14 32 23 54 
South Korea 47 13 9 41 35 16 10 48 16 37 24 47 3 40 28 56 
Sri Lanka 46 12 4 42 32 20 15 48 28 30 18 43 17 27 15 56 
Taiwan 34 22 15 45 29 27 19 44 8 46 36 46 2 26 22 72 
Thailand 48 15 12 37 36 19 13 45 23 29 22 48 10 44 35 46 
Turkey 49 16 11 35 42 22 13 36 27 20 17 54 11 27 22 63 
                                  
Argentina 16 33 23 52 17 39 32 44 6 41 29 52 9 36 23 55 
Brazil 24 24 19 52 21 37 30 42 11 44 33 45 6 30 18 64 
Chile 15 26 17 59 12 41 25 47 7 37 22 55 4 42 16 53 
Colombia 35 17 13 48 32 23 16 46 20 32 24 48 12 34 16 53 
Mexico 20 21 17 59 16 21 15 64 9 34 22 57 4 26 18 70 
Peru 37 28 15 35 21 32 20 47 12 43 20 45 7 35 16 58 
Venezuela 8 48 11 45 7 43 11 50 6 46 16 49 4 55 18 40 
                                  
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 31 34 9 35         27 35 15 38 46 27 7 28 
Cote d'Ivoire 48 13   39 48 13   39 26 20 13 54 23 26 19 51 
Egypt 44 12 8 44 30 24 14 46 18 37 12 45 15 36 17 49 
Ghana 41 10   49 41 10   49 58 12 8 30 37 25 9 37 
Kenya 44 17 11 39 38 18 9 44 33 21 13 47 27 19 12 54 
Morocco 37 30 15 33 32 26 13 42 18 31 17 50 13 29 17 58 
Nigeria 68 10 2 22 64 8 4 28 21 46 8 34 23 57 4 20 
South Africa 19 35 16 47 11 38 20 51 6 48 22 45 3 31 19 67 
Tanzania 62 9 3 20 61 9 4 30     12   46 17 7 37 
Zambia 9 71 3 19 12 67 4 21 15 42 19 43 23 30 11 47 
                                  
Averages:                 
Asia 49 14 10 36 39 20 14 41 25 33 22 42 13 35 24 52 
Latin America 22 28 16 50 18 34 21 48 10 40 24 50 7 37 18 56 
Africa 44 19 9 36 37 24 10 39 25 32 14 43 26 30 12 45 
Developing 
countries 41 19 11 40 33 25 15 42 21 35 20 44 16 34 18 51 
                                  
16 OECD 
countries 15 42 31 43 10 42 30 48 4 36 24 59 2 28 17 70 
Notes  
a.  Earliest year for which data are available: 1950, except for Morocco, Taiwan and Thailand, 1951; China and 
Tanzania, 1952; South Korea, 1953; Malaysia and Zambia, 1955; Ghana, Ivory Coast, 1960. Belgium, 1953, 
West Germany, Italy and Norway, 1951, Japan, 1952; 
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b  China, 1962, proportions for 1960 not representative due to collapse of agriculture in great leap forward 58-60; 
Morocco, 1965, manufacturing share Tanzania, 1961 
c  Canada 2003 instead of 2005, Venezuela 2004 
d.  Bangladesh 1950-59, same data as Pakistan 
 
Sources:  
See detailed discussion of sources in Annex Table 1. The primary sources used are:  UN, Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics, 1957, 1962 and 1967; Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 10 sector database, 
http://www.ggdc.net/index-dseries.html; World Bank, WDI online, accessed April 2008;. World Tables, 1980; 
OECD, 1950, unless otherwise specified from OECD, National Accounts, microfiche edition, 1971. Japan 1953 from 
GGDC ten sector data base 
 
 
Table 3 presents average shares of manufacturing for a much larger sample of 63 developing 
countries, including many smaller economies. The country data are reproduced in Annex Table 1. 
Table 3 confirms the patterns of table 2, though the average peak value for the share of 
manufacturing in 1980 is somewhat lower than in table 2. 
Table 3: Shares of Manufacturing in GDP in 63 Developing Countries,  1950 - 2005 
 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Average 20 Asian 
countries 
8.9 11.2 12.5 13.8 16.8 18.2 20.5 20.1 19.9 19.0 18.7 20.1 
Average 23 Latin 
America countries 
14.7 15.2 16.6 18.4 19.2 20.1 19.7 19.7 18.9 17.3 16.6 15.7 
Average 20 African 
countries 
11.0 8.4 9.1 9.9 10.4 11.8 11.7 12.3 13.7 12.4 12.0 11.3 
                          
Average 63 
Developing 
countries 
11.9 12.2 13.1 14.3 15.5 16.8 17.2 17.3 17.5 16.3 15.9 15.7 
                          
Average 16 OECD 
countries 
31.3 30.7 30.1 30.7 27.7 24.9 24.1 21.9 20.8 19.8 18.3 16.6 
Source:  see Annex Table 1. 
 
3: Why is manufacturing considered to be the engine of growth? 
There are powerful empirical and theoretical arguments in favour of industrialisation as the main 
engine of growth in economic development. The arguments can be summarised as follows: 
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1. There is an empirical correlation between the degree of industrialisation and per capita 
income in developing countries.  
2. Productivity is higher in the industrial sector than in the agricultural sector. The transfer of 
resources from agriculture to manufacturing provides a structural change bonus. 
3. The transfer of resources from manufacturing to services provides a structural change burden 
in the form of Baumol’s disease. As the share of the service sector increases, aggregate per 
capita growth will tend to slow down. 
4. Compared to agriculture, the manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for capital 
accumulation in developing countries. Capital accumulation can be more easily realised in 
spatially concentrated manufacturing than in spatially dispersed agriculture. This is one of the 
reasons why the emergence of manufacturing has been so important in growth and 
development. Capital intensity is high in mining, manufacturing, utilities and transport. It is 
much lower in agriculture and services. Capital accumulation is one of the aggregate sources 
of growth. Thus, an increasing share of manufacturing will contribute to aggregate growth.  
5. The manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for economies of scale, which are less 
available in agriculture or services.  
6. The manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for both embodied and disembodied 
technological progress (Cornwall, 1977). Technological advance is concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector and diffuses from there to other economic sectors such as the service 
sector. 
7. Linkage and spillover effects are stronger in manufacturing than in agriculture or mining. 
Linkage effects refer to the direct backward and forward linkages between different sectors. 
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Linkage effects create positive externalities to investments in given sectors. Spillover effects 
refer to the disembodied knowledge flows between sectors. Spillover effects are a special 
case of externalities which to refer to externalities of investment in knowledge and 
technology. Linkage and spillover effects are presumed to be stronger within manufacturing 
than within other sectors. Linkage and spillover effects between manufacturing and other 
sectors such as services or agriculture are also very powerful. 
8. As per capita incomes rise, the share of agricultural expenditures in total expenditures 
declines and the share of expenditures on manufactured goods increases (Engel’s law). 
Countries specialising in agricultural and primary production will not profit from expanding 
world markets for manufacturing goods. 
 
These arguments are frequently mentioned in the literature and are often considered self-evident, 
though the recent literature increasing questions whether manufacturing will continue to be the 
engine of growth. We examine the empirical support for these arguments. In doing so, we may 
find that some of the arguments need to be qualified. They should also be considered in a 
temporal perspective. The applicability of different arguments may well differ in different 
historical contexts. The sources of growth change over time.  
 
4: Empirical Correlations between Industrialisation and Economic 
Development 
The empirical argument points to the overall correlation between degree of industrialisation and 
the level of economic development. Not only are the advanced economies more industrialised, 
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than developing countries. Also, the more successful developing countries are invariably those, 
which have been able to industrialise. The historical record provides strong support for this 
correlation. 
 Statistically the correlation is less easy to demonstrate, because the advanced economies have 
become service economies where service sectors account for over two thirds of GDP. Also, the 
sequence of structural change in developing economies is different from the earlier patterns of 
structural change in the presently advanced economies.  In the earlier pattern of structural change, 
the shares of manufacturing in GDP and employment increased first, the shares of services 
increased later. In developing countries the share of services in GDP was usually already larger 
than that of the industrial sector in the 1950s and 1960s (see table 2 above, and Szirmai, 2005). 
Therefore, one will not find much correlation between share of manufacturing in total GDP and 
the level of per capita income. 
 We have tried to capture the empirical relationship between industrialisation and development 
in Table 4.  In this table, we focus on the share of manufacturing in the total commodity production 
(i.e. agriculture and industry, including mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities) rather 
than in total GDP (see for a similar approach Balance et al, 1982, pp. 110 ff). The share of 
manufacturing in commodities is set out against a country’s per capita gross national income in 
2000. We find a significant positive correlation of 0.79 between the logarithm of income per capita 
and the share of manufacturing.  
 In line with the argument in the previous section about different patterns of structural change 
and different initial conditions, the correlation is not a perfect one. Major exceptions among the 
advanced economies are primary exporters such as Norway, Canada and Australia. Among the 
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developing countries, Taiwan, Thailand and Brazil rank higher in terms of industrialisation than in 
terms of income. Nevertheless, the table illustrates the general point about industrialisation. The 
poorest countries in the table are invariably those with the lowest shares of manufacturing (and the 
highest shares of agriculture). The more prosperous countries are the more industrialised ones. 
 
Table 4 
Industrialisation and Per Capita Gross National Product in 2000 
(45 countries) 
  Share of manufacturing in GNP per capita (2000 US$)
  total commodity production (a)  
  (%) (b) Ranking  Ranking
Switzerland 72 2 38,140 1
Japan 64 11 35,620 2
Norway 26 40 34,530 3
U.S.A. 63 14 34,100 4
Denmark 60 17 32,280 5
Sweden 66 9 27,140 6
Austria 60 16 25,220 7
Finland 66 8 25,130 8
Germany 72 3 25,120 9
Netherlands 58 18 24,970 10
Belgium 69 4 24,540 11
U.K. 60 15 24,430 12
France 65 10 24,090 13
Canada 56 20 21,130 14
Australia 45 25 20,240 15
Italy 66 7 20,160 16
Taiwan 77 1 14,188 17
South Korea 66 6 8,910 18
Argentina 55 22 7,460 19
Mexico 63 12 5,070 20
Chile 36 32 4,590 21
Venezuela 35 34 4,310 22
Brazil 67 5 3,580 23
Malaysia 58 19 3,380 24
Turkey 36 30 3,100 25
South Africa 55 21 3,020 26
Peru 41 26 2,080 27
Colombia 31 36 2,020 28
Thailand 63 13 2,000 29
Egypt 38 29 1,490 30
Nigeria 38 28 1,180 31
Philippines 48 24 1,040 32
Sri Lanka 36 33 850 33
China 52 23 840 34
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Côte d’Ivoire 36 31 600 35
Indonesia 41 27 570 36
India 31 38 450 37
Pakistan 31 37 440 38
Bangladesh 30 39 370 39
Kenya 34 35 350 40
Ghana 15 42 340 41
Zambia 25 41 300 42
Tanzania 12 43 270 43
Morocco 5 45 260 44
Congo, Dem. Rep. 6 44 100 45
a Value added in manufacturing as percentage of total value in commodity production 
(agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities).  
 b Manufacturing share OECD countries, latest year in period 1998-2000 
Sources: 
GNP per capita and shares from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002,  
except: Zaire from World Bank ((http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html) 
Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada and the USA: calculated with OECD Main Economic 
Indicators ((http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0, EN-document-7-nodirectorate-no-1-5194-7,00.html) 
and UNIDO Industrial Statistics (http://www.unido.org/Regions.cfm?area=GLO) 
 
 
5: Structural Change Bonus 
A second argument in favour of industrialisation states that labour productivity in agriculture is 
much lower than labour productivity in industry. A transfer of labour from low productivity 
agriculture to high productivity industry results in an immediate increase in overall productivity and 
income per capita. This transfer has been a major source of growth in developing countries. It is 
referred to as the structural change bonus (Chenery et al., 1986; Lewis, 1954; Fei and Ranis, 1964; 
Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999; Timmer and Szirmai, 2000; Ark, B. van, and M. Timmer, 2003; 
Temple and Woessman, 2006; Timmer and de Vries, 2007).  
 
 Table 5 presents data on value added per worker for a selected number of developing 
countries for which data are available for longer periods. It is immediately clear from this table 
that value added per worker is much higher in manufacturing than in agriculture. This is in line 
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with the structural bonus argument. There will be a positive static shift effect, when workers 
relocate to manufacturing. 
 It is also not surprising that labour productivity in the capital intensive mining sector is far 
higher than that in manufacturing. The results with regard to services are more puzzling. Between 
1950 and 1970, labour productivity in the service sector in Latin American countries is much 
higher than in manufacturing. If this is not due to measurement error, this would suggest that 
transfer of resources to services would provide a higher static shift effect than to manufacturing, 
which is counterintuitive. From 1980 onwards, however, productivity in manufacturing is 
substantially higher than in services, which is more in line with our expectations.7 
 A second aspect of the structural change bonus argument focuses on the dynamics of sectors. If 
productivity growth in manufacturing is more rapid than in other sectors, a transfer of resources to 
this sector will result in more rapid aggregate growth (This is referred to as the dynamic shift 
effect). Here the evidence is more mixed. In the richest countries of the world growth of labour 
productivity in agriculture in the post-war period has been higher than in industry - particularly due 
to biotechnological innovation (see Maddison, 1991, pp.150-51). However, in developing countries 
since 1950, productivity growth in manufacturing has been more rapid than in the primary sector.  
                                                 
7
  The use of constant prices with a base year in the 1990s of course overestimates relative value added in the early 
years, as manufacturing prices increase less than service prices. But a similar table with current values - not 
reproduced here - shows very similar patterns. 
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Table 5: Value Added per worker in Agriculture and Manufacturing (constant prices) 
 1950  1960  1970 
 Ag Min Ind Man 
Service
s Tot  Ag Min Ind Man 
Service
s Tot  Ag Min Ind Man 
Service
s Tot 
India        77 344 162 120 155 100  67 350 192 140 179 100 
Indonesia                     
Malaysia                     
Pakistan                     
Philippines                     
South Korea               49 153 125 88 167 100 
Sri Lanka                     
Taiwan               40 294 119 111 147 100 
Thailand        46 238 326 283 287 100  38 134 300 294 274 100 
Turkey                     
                     
Argentina 29 94 113 98 134 100  39 142 91 86 135 100  43 242 115 114 110 100 
Bolivia 31 783 334 205 235 100  32 799 298 229 231 100  25 621 268 194 183 100 
Brazil 26 111 180 165 220 100  22 173 204 196 179 100  19 269 169 180 170 100 
Chile 28 183 125 78 139 100  21 162 147 127 125 100  19 229 151 127 114 100 
Colombia 54 262 160 134 160 100  50 277 171 147 140 100  53 385 159 129 118 100 
Costa Rica 46 31 144 149 187 100  36 30 127 141 189 100  41 40 131 157 149 100 
Mexico 30 166 139 130 237 100  27 121 131 127 208 100  26 96 115 112 180 100 
Peru        26 452 173 137 198 100  23 481 159 142 169 100 
Venezuela 11 1649 332 78 80 100  12 1950 313 90 61 100  18 2691 270 105 63 100 
                     
average Asia               48 233 184 158 192 100 
average Latin 
am. 32 410 191 130 174 100  30 456 184 142 163 100  30 562 171 140 139 100 
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Table 5: continued: 
 1980  1990  2000 
 Ag Min Ind Man 
Service
s Tot  Ag Min Ind Man 
Service
s Tot  Ag Min Ind Man 
Service
s Tot 
India 57 555 222 158 206 100  50 458 221 175 190 100  41 446 169 142 219 100 
Indonesia 42 2909 320 165 110 100  39 1253 243 193 119 100  40 1099 217 196 96 100 
Malaysia 61 1013 169 120 97 100  64 1737 149 126 91 100  54 1981 123 115 98 100 
Pakistan                     
Philippines 49 304 274 261 95 100  54 287 248 278 95 100  56 333 243 271 89 100 
South Korea 41 172 131 113 130 100  48 160 132 115 95 100  57 427 181 192 69 100 
Sri Lanka                     
Taiwan 36 258 98 96 135 100  31 398 92 95 126 100  27 392 88 96 118 100 
Thailand 33 167 249 259 206 100  24 479 246 263 187 100  28 1110 220 243 122 100 
Turkey                     
                     
Argentina 46 327 112 115 105 100  67 480 123 127 96 100  76 700 166 161 85 100 
Bolivia 32 312 198 181 133 100  40 438 236 229 112 100  49 462 155 170 108 100 
Brazil 17 205 173 190 140 100  28 372 154 143 116 100  37 646 182 166 95 100 
Chile 25 316 149 130 104 100  39 268 151 125 93 100  63 625 175 145 79 100 
Colombia 55 137 169 162 107 100  61 329 165 138 98 100  67 401 165 143 93 100 
Costa Rica 42 52 127 151 123 100  47 111 115 126 126 100  62 72 140 163 95 100 
Mexico 26 153 106 104 145 100  32 179 105 107 131 100  37 322 110 120 113 100 
Peru 18 362 180 169 144 100  31 384 167 145 118 100  32 689 224 173 111 100 
Venezuela 36 1545 190 131 71 100  43 1393 201 155 71 100  38 1759 213 137 66 100 
                     
average Asia 46 768 209 167 140 100  44 682 190 178 129 100  43 827 177 179 116 100 
average Latin 
am. 33 379 156 148 119 100  43 439 157 144 107 100  51 631 170 153 94 100 
Source: GGDC: ten sector database, downloaded September 2008 
Note: Constant prices, base year varies per country, but all in mid nineties. 
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 In table 6, we present a comparison of growth rates in manufacturing and agriculture in a 
sample of developing countries (derived from the GGDC 10-sector database). These are 
compared with sectoral growth rates in advanced economies in the post-war period. This table 
provides some interesting findings which provide a more nuanced picture of the role of 
manufacturing in growth. Between 1950 and 1973, the growth rate of labour productivity in 
manufacturing is substantially higher than in agriculture and also higher than that in the total; 
economy. This is even more pronounced if we look at growth of output (8.6% versus 3.9%). 
Manufacturing is clearly a very dynamic sector contributing to overall growth performance. In 
ten of the fourteen developing countries, productivity growth in manufacturing is higher than 
in agriculture. In the case of value added, all countries show higher growth in manufacturing. 
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Table 6: Growth of Output and Productivity in Agriculture and Manufacturing, 1950-2005 
Country Agric- Manu- Total Agri- Manu- Total Agri- Manu- Total Agri- Manu- Total
Argentina 2,8 2,6 1,3 1,9 3,6 2,6 3,0 1,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 1,8
Bolivia 1,9 2,1 2,7 1,2 3,3 3,0 2,5 -1,3 -0,4 2,7 2,6 2,4
Brazil 2,1 4,9 4,1 3,8 8,8 7,5 3,9 0,2 0,9 3,4 2,4 3,2
Chile 0,1 4,0 2,0 0,4 6,3 3,6 5,7 2,5 1,5 5,7 2,9 4,1
Colombia 2,3 3,8 1,0 3,4 6,5 3,5 1,3 0,3 0,7 2,6 3,0 3,7
Costa Rica 3,6 3,9 3,5 5,0 8,7 7,0 1,8 1,0 0,5 2,8 4,7 4,1
India 0,4 3,7 1,9 2,3 5,4 3,5 0,9 3,0 2,9 2,7 6,1 5,3
Indonesia 2,1 1,6 3,7 3,1 6,8 5,9 2,3 4,9 2,9 3,1 9,2 5,4
Korea 3,1 7,3 4,6 3,8 15,9 6,1 4,8 8,4 4,9 1,6 11,2 7,3
Malaysia 3,8 3,5 3,8 2,6 9,0 6,7
Mexico 2,8 3,0 3,6 3,6 7,7 6,2 1,7 0,6 0,4 1,8 3,5 3,4
Peru 5,4 19,3 16,6 3,2 7,4 5,9 1,5 0,7 0,1 2,9 1,8 2,3
Philippines 1,0 0,3 0,6 2,5 2,8 3,4
Taiwan 10,9 11,1 12,4 12,2 22,2 17,2 7,6 6,9 8,8 4,3 9,1 11,0
Thailand 3,1 5,6 4,9 4,7 9,4 7,1 2,6 2,9 3,5 3,2 8,1 6,1
Venezuela 5,3 3,5 2,1 5,3 8,9 5,5 1,1 0,7 -1,2 2,1 2,1 1,7
Australia 3,4 2,5 1,6 2,8 1,3 3,2
Austria 3,5 3,6 2,2 1,1 2,4 2,4
Belgium 3,7 4,1 1,7 1,6 2,0 2,1
Czech Republic 7,1 5,0 2,5 1,4 4,7 2,1
Denmark 6,3 1,9 1,5 2,9 0,4 1,8
Finland 4,5 4,8 0,0 0,7 3,9 0,0
France 4,7 3,1 1,7 1,4 1,5 2,2
Germany 4,1 2,4 1,5 0,7 1,0 2,0
Greece 3,4 2,5 1,6 2,8 1,3 3,2
Hungary 10,8 7,7 4,0 1,6 5,5 2,9
Ireland 4,2 6,8 2,9 1,8 7,4 4,8
Italy 5,7 2,4 1,5 1,5 2,0 2,1
Japan 5,7 8,3 6,4 2,4 12,5 8,4 2,6 4,5 2,7 -0,6 3,6 3,1
Netherlands 3,7 3,1 1,2 3,3 2,1 2,5
Poland 1,4 7,2 4,0 1,7 5,0 3,6
Spain 6,0 1,9 1,4 2,5 2,1 2,7
Sweden 3,6 4,4 1,9 0,4 3,0 2,2
UK 2,9 2,9 1,6 1,2 0,3 2,0
USA 5,3 3,7 1,3 4,9 2,8 2,9
Average:
Developing Countries 3,3 5,4 4,6 3,9 8,6 6,1 2,8 2,3 1,9 2,9 5,0 4,5
Advanced Economies 4,6 3,9 1,9 1,8 2,8 2,5
1950-1973 1973-2005
Value addedLabour productivity Labour productivity Value added
 
 23 
Own calculations using data from: 
Advanced economies plus South Korea, 1973-2005: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, EUKLEMS database, downloaded 
July 2008 
Developing countries, 1950-2005, incl. South Korea, 1953-2005. Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 10-sector database, 
downloaded 2008. 
Developing countries with incomplete data include the following: Bolivia (lab 50-03); India (lab, 60-04); Indonesia (lab 61-05; va, 60-
05); Korea (lab, 63-05; VA, 53-05); Malaysia (lab 75-05 ; VA, 70-05); Peru (Lab, 60-05); Philippines (Lab 63-05; VA 51-05); Taiwan 
(Lab 63-05; VA 51-05); Thailand (Lab 60-05; VA 51- 
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After 1973, the picture becomes more complicated. Our sample of developing countries starts 
looking more like the advanced economies in that productivity growth in agriculture is 
systematically higher than in manufacturing. This is true for 12 out of the sixteen countries 
for which we have the data in the dataset (see table 7). However, in terms of value added the 
growth rate in manufacturing is still higher in most of the countries (10 out of 16). This is 
consistent with a shrinking share of agriculture in total value added. The same pattern can be 
seen in the sample of advanced economies. In terms of productivity per person engaged, the 
agriculture sector systematically outperforms the manufacturing sector and the total economy. 
A smaller fraction of the total labour force is producing more and more output per person in 
agriculture. The only real exceptions are the European catch up economies Poland and 
Ireland, where productivity growth in manufacturing is much higher than in agriculture.  
 However, in terms of value added, growth, in manufacturing and the total economy is 
much higher than in agriculture. Its share in valued added has been systematically shrinking. 
Summarising the information in tables 6 and 7, we can say that in developing countries 
manufacturing is indeed one of the more dynamic sectors in terms of productivity and output 
growth, especially in the period 1950-73. In the period 1973-2003, productivity growth in 
agriculture surpasses that of manufacturing, but manufacturing still dominates in terms of 
output growth.  
 
Table 7: Comparison of Growth Rates in Agriculture and Manufacturing, 1950-2005 
(Number of countries) 
(Number of countries)       
    1950-1973   1973-2005 
  AG>MAN MAN>AG MAN=AG AG>MAN MAN>AG MAN=AG 
Developing Countries       
   Labour productivity growth 4 10 0 12 4 0 
   Value added growth 0 14 0 5 10 1 
       
Advanced economies       
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   Labour productivity growth    11 7 1 
   Value added growth       7 13 0 
Source: see note to Table 4 
Note: The table lists the numbers of countries where growth in agriculture exceeds that in manufacturing and 
vice versa 
 
6: Structural Change Burden 
In many service sectors, the possibilities for productivity growth are limited due to the 
inherently labour intensive nature of service production. This implies that an increasing share of 
services results in a productivity slowdown (Baumol’s law). Such service sectors include 
personal services, restaurants and hotels, health care and medical services and government. 
What productivity improvement there is, often takes the place of reducing quality of output or 
simply providing less services for the same price, so it should not show up in productivity 
indices if these were correctly measured using hedonic price indices. 
 Baumol’s law has recently come under fire, because there are some very important market 
service sectors such as the financial sector and sales and distribution where there are major 
productivity improvements, based on ICT technologies. 
 Nevertheless the working hypothesis is that a country with a large service sector will tend to 
grow slower than a country with a smaller service sector. As advanced economies are 
predominantly service economies, this creates new possibilities for catch up in developing 
countries where the industrial and the manufacturing sector have a proportionately larger share 
in output. 
 On the other hand, developing countries are characterised by a very large share of the service 
sector at early stages of development. They did not follow the traditional linear sequence of a 
shift from agriculture to manufacturing, followed by a shift from manufacturing to services. As 
much of the large service sector in developing countries is accounted for by a large, inefficient 
and unproductive sector of government services, developing countries suffer from a structural 
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change burden at early stages of development. It is hard to prove this with in regression analysis, 
because of endogeneity. Rich countries have larger service sectors because the demand for 
services increases at higher level of incomes. So service sector shares are not negatively 
correlated with per capita income. 8 
 
7: Opportunities for Capital Accumulation 
The reasons for high labour productivity and rapid labour productivity growth in manufacturing 
are manifold. Important reasons included capital accumulation, economies of scale and 
technological progress. Spatially concentrated activities such as manufacturing offer better 
possibilities for capital accumulation and capital intensification than spatially dispersed 
agriculture. The most capital intensive sectors in the economy are manufacturing, mining, 
construction and utilities. 
                                                 
8
 A better approach is to analyse the impact of the sectoral shares at the beginning of a period on growth rates of 
gdp per capita in that period (cf. Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999). 
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Table 8: Sector Capital Intensity in Agriculture and Manufacturing 
(Sectoral Capital Intensity as % of Total)a b 
 1970  1980  1990  2000  
 Agric. 
Manuf
. Agric. 
Manuf
. Agric. 
Manuf
. Agric. 
Manuf
. 
 India       25      199       24      210       20      206    
 Indonesia         3      114         3        65       10        57    
 Pakistan       34        93       27      120       22      134    
 Philippines       42      138       14      166         9      168    
 South Korea       18      159       25      100       42        87    
 Sri Lanka           7        53         4        31    
 Taiwan       32      131       29        85       27        77    
 Turkey       26      188       22      173       16        88    
 Argentina       59        52        52     
 Chile       48        88       67        70       77        37    
 Colombia       19        89       15        90       11        70    
 Peru       13      133       14      130       16        97    
 Venezuela       63      109       40        88       28        87    
 Egypt       33      166       25      186       27      181    
 Morocco             6     
         
Average developing countries      32      134       26      118       24      102    
         
Australia    114        50     125        55     112        71     105        81  
Austria        59        69       60        81       62        90  
Czech Rep.            59        64  
Denmark    141        53     177        65     207        69     235        84  
Finland      44        98       77        81     114        95     151        94  
West Germany      71        61       83        68       97        74    
Germany          110        85  
Italy      52        85       69        95     107      100     137      108  
Japan      67      114       72        97       93        93     118      105  
Netherlands    106        67     125        69     135        80     146        90  
Portugal            33        95  
Sweden          119      106  
UK    207        76     226        84     205        95     178        98  
USA    151        81     173        89     145        96     114      104  
         
Average advanced economies    106        76     119        77     127        85     121        93  
Own calculations from the following sources: capital stock developing countries, Larson et al., 2000; persons 
engaged developing countries, GGDC 10 sector database, except Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan from ILO, Labour 
Statistics Database, 2008. Advanced economies: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, EUKLEMS 
database. 
 
Notes: a. capital intensity total calculated excluding real estate for advanced economies.  Real estate refers to the 
residential capital stock. We assume the totals for developing countries from Larson et al. 2000 also exclude real 
estate; b.  agricultural capital stock in developing countries refers to gross fixed capital stock excluding tree stock 
and cattle stock. In the advanced economy data, agricultural capital stock includes tree stock and cattle stock. This 
results in an upward bias in the estimates of agricultural capital intensity.   
 
Internationally comparable data on capital stocks are scarce, especially for developing 
countries. In table 8, we have put together data for a selected number of developing countries 
from a World Bank database compiled by Larson et al. (2000) and compared these with data 
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for advanced economies from the EUKLEMS database. This table provides some very 
interesting results 
o In developing countries capital intensity in manufacturing is much higher than in 
agriculture (as expected). The same is true for mining and utilities (not reproduced 
here). The shift from agriculture to manufacturing is important in the process of 
aggregate capital accumulation. 
o Between 1970 and 1990 capital intensity in manufacturing as percentage of the total 
economy capital intensity declines. Other sectors become more capital intensive. The 
importance of manufacturing as the sector driving capital accumulation declines.  
o In the advanced economies capital intensity the roles of agriculture and manufacturing 
have been reversed. Capital intensity in the small sector of agriculture is much higher 
than in manufacturing. This has to do with the ‘industrialisation of agriculture’. In the 
advanced economies the share of agricultural labour and value added has declined 
enormously, but agriculture has become much more productive due to the application 
of very capital intensive technologies such as greenhouse farming, intensive pig 
farming, cattle farming and poultry farming, application of combines etc. etc. But 
there is also a measurement problem. The EUKLEMS data seem to include tree stocks 
and cattle stocks which I have been able to exclude in the developing country data 
because they do not refer to capital accumulation in the modern technological sense. 
This overstates the capital intensiveness of agriculture. 
o The advanced economy data illustrate that manufacturing has become one of the less 
capital intensive sectors of the economy. The EUKLEMS data indicate that mining, 
utilities and transport are the most capital intensive sectors. Agriculture also has above 
average capital intensity. Manufacturing has become much less important as a key 
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sector where capital accumulation takes place. There are again several measurement 
issues. The data in the table refer to total fixed capital formation, including fixed 
structures. It is very likely the in terms of machinery and equipment the data would 
show a more important role for manufacturing.  
 
 In economic growth accounting studies, the contribution of growth of physical capital to 
growth of output in post-war advanced economies turns out to be less important than previously 
thought. Other factors such as growth of employment, growth of human capital and 
disembodied technological change are very important as well (Maddison, 1987; Thirlwall, 
1997). However, for developing countries, physical capital accumulation still seems to be of 
great importance, because they start with so much less capital per worker (Nadiri, 1972; 
Thirlwall, 1997; Pilat, 1994; Hoffman, 1965, Bosworth et al., 1995). 
 
8: Opportunities for Scale Economies  
Historically the industrial sector (including mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities) 
profited in particular from economies of scale, compared to service sectors and agriculture. This 
is partly due to the nature of technologies which are most productively applied in large scale 
production. But it also has to do with learning by doing. Expansion of production expands the 
scope for learning (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999). Thus, the rate of growth of productivity in 
manufacturing depends positively on the rate of growth of output (Verdoorn, 1949; Kaldor, 
1966).  
 With the rise of ICT technologies this has may have changed from the 1990s onwards. In 
certain service sectors, scale effects have become overwhelmingly important, as the marginal 
costs of providing an additional unit of service have come close to zero. The question is justified 
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whether the role of manufacturing in future growth may become less important than in the past 
sixty years. The service sector might become the new engine of growth. It is too early to say 
whether this is indeed the case. Many service sectors, such as government, medical services, 
education, and personal care still suffer from Baumol’s law. In the case of digitalised services, 
the marginal costs may be close to zero, but there is an increasing problem of appropriation of 
revenues from these services, as the flow of services becomes impossible to control and 
valorise. 
 
9: Technological Change 
The manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for both embodied and disembodied 
technological progress. Rapid capital accumulation is associated with embodied technological 
progress, as new generations of capital goods embody the latest state of the art of technology. 
Disembodied technological progress refers to changes in the knowledge of product and 
process technologies in firms and in the economy as a whole. Since, the industrial revolution, 
technological advance has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector and diffuses from 
there to other economic sectors such as the service sector. Cornwall (1977) in particular has 
argued that manufacturing is the locus of technological progress. 
 Some brief remarks need to be made here about the difficulties in unscrambling capital 
accumulation and technological change. From the perspective of a developing country, the use 
of more capital goods per worker in itself represents an important kind of technological change. 
The mode of production changes dramatically, and the mastering of new – usually imported – 
technologies – requires major innovative efforts on behalf of developing countries and their 
firms. In this sense, all capital accumulation in developing countries represents technological 
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change. It involves the diffusion of machinery from the advanced economies and diffusion of 
the technologies embodied in them.   
 But, one needs to distinguish between the increase in the pure volume of existing capital 
goods (more of the same) and the shift over time from technologically less sophisticated to 
technologically more advanced capital goods. This is called embodied technological change.  
This is still a form of international diffusion of technology through capital imports, but now 
with the emphasis on the upgrading of the capital stock. 
 Next, in the course of economic development, output per unit of input (total factor 
productivity) can increase due to various factors, among which shifts from one economic sector 
to another, economies of scale and more efficient allocation of resources within sectors. One of 
the most important factors, which can cause increases in output per unit of input, is so-called 
disembodied technological change. Disembodied technological change refers to general 
advances in science, technology and the state of knowledge, changes in the stocks of knowledge 
available firms, sectors or countries; improvements in the level of knowledge absorbed by 
employees and managers in educational institutions and on the job (Maddison, 1987, p. 662), 
learning by doing by workers and managers on the job, improvements in the collective 
technological capabilities of firms or the social capabilities of countries and finally positive 
external effects of investment in knowledge and new technologies, through spillovers from firm 
to firm or from country to country. 
 
10: Linkage and Spillover Effects 
Linkage effects refer to the direct backward and forward linkages between different sectors.  
Linkages are direct physical relations of intersectoral supply and demand. The positive external 
effect of linkages is that they can create economies of scale in the domestic economy. Spillover 
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effects refer to the disembodied knowledge and technology flows between economic actors 
and economic sectors. Actors learn from each other, so that investment in technological 
knowledge or increased efficiency in one firm has positive external effects in the economy as 
a whole. 
 Intersectoral backward and forward linkages in manufacturing are perceived to be much 
stronger than in mining or agriculture which are typically characterised by weak linkages 
(Hirschman, 1958, Cornwall, 1977; Myint, 1980). Investment in one branch of manufacturing 
can have strong positive external effects on other sectors. 
 Spillover effects between manufacturing and other sectors are also very powerful. As 
indicated above, the manufacturing sector is one of the primary sources of technological 
advance in the economy as a whole. It is here that most product and process technologies are 
developed. One of the important spillover effects in modern economies is that from the 
industrial sector to other sectors, such as the service sector. Thus, advances in ICT hardware 
technologies produced in the manufacturing sector (silicon chips, glass fibre cables) fuel 
technological change in the software producing and software using service sectors. 
 
11: The Engel Law 
The argument in the previous paragraph was couched in terms of supply factors. But demand 
relationships also crucial for the argument that manufacturing is an engine of growth. The 
lower the per capita income of a country, the larger the proportion of that income will be 
spent on basic agricultural foodstuffs. This is the famous Engel law (Engel, 1857). As per 
capita incomes increase, the demand for agricultural products will decline and the demand for 
industrial products will tend to increase. Economic development creates a mass market for 
industrial products. This creates dynamic opportunities for manufacturing. If a country 
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remains in agriculture and fails to develop its domestic manufacturing industry, it will have to 
import increasing amounts of manufactured goods. 
 
12: Engine of Growth 
Contributions of manufacturing can be measured in different ways: using growth accounting 
techniques and econometric analysis (Bosworth, Collins and Chen, 1995; Fagerberg and 
Verspagen, 1999, 2002, 2007, Timmer and de Vries, 2007). Growth accounting techniques 
analyse what proportion of a given growth rate of national income derives from growth of 
manufacturing. These techniques are straightforward and transparent. But they do tend to 
underestimate the contributions of dynamic sectors, because they do not take various external 
effects and spillovers into account. The role of manufacturing in nurturing technological 
advance and enhancing spillovers makes the net contribution of manufacturing to aggregate 
growth greater than found measuring direct sectoral contributions to growth. These spillover 
effects are better captured with econometric techniques. 
 
The evidence in the secondary literature is mixed. The older literature tends to emphasise the 
importance of manufacturing, the more recent literature places finds that the contribution of 
service sector has increased. Also, in the more recent literature one finds, that manufacturing 
tends to be more important as an engine of growth in developing countries than in advanced 
economies and also more important in the period 1950-1973 than in the period after 1973.  
 
Fagerberg and Verspagen (1999) regress real growth rates on growth rates of manufacturing. If 
the coefficient of manufacturing growth is higher than the share of manufacturing in GDP, this 
is interpreted as supporting the engine of growth hypothesis. Fagerberg and Verspagen find that 
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manufacturing was typically an engine of growth in developing countries in East Asia and Latin 
America, but that there was no significant effect of manufacturing in the advanced economies. 
In a second article by the same authors (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002), they examine the 
impact of shares of manufacturing and services in three periods: 1966-72, 1973-83 and 1884-95 
for a sample of 76 countries. They find that manufacturing has much more positive 
contributions before 1973 than after. The interpretation in both papers is that the period 1950-
1973 offered special opportunities for catch up through the absorption of mass production 
techniques in manufacturing from the USA. After 1973, ICT technologies started to become 
more important as a source of productivity growth, especially in the nineties. These 
technologies are no longer within the exclusive domain of manufacturing, but operate in the 
service sector. A recent article by Timmer and de Vries (2007) also confirms the increasing 
importance of the service sector. Using growth accounting techniques, they examine the 
contributions of different sectors in periods of growth accelerations, in periods of normal 
growth and in periods of deceleration. In periods of normal growth they find that 
manufacturing contributes most. In periods of acceleration, this leading role is taken over by 
the service sector, though manufacturing continues to have an important positive 
contribution. 
  
In sum, both the empirical information contained in this paper and the secondary literature 
presents a somewhat mixed picture. Manufacturing is definitely important, especially in the 
period 1950-73 and more so in developing countries than in advanced economies. In advanced 
economies, the contribution of the service sector has become more and more important and that 
the share of services in GDP is now well above 70 per cent in the advanced economies. This 
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raises the question whether manufacturing will continue to be the engine of growth in catch up 
economies that it has been since 1950.9  
 
13: Conclusion 
In this paper I have presented an overview of theoretical arguments and some empirical 
evidence for the proposition that in the past fifty years, manufacturing has functioned as an 
important engine of growth in developing countries. statistical evidence is not 
straightforward. Manufacturing has been important, but not all expectations are borne out by 
the data.  
The more general historical evidence does give more support to the industrialisation thesis. I 
would argue that there are no important examples of success in economic development in 
developing countries since 1950, which have not been driven by industrialisation. All the 
Asian success stories are stories of industrialisation. Neither tourism, nor primary exports, nor 
services have played a similar role, with the possible exception of India since 2000. Sub-
Saharan African countries are underrepresented in the statistical exercises and the databases. 
They all have performed weakly in industrialisation. It is clear, that one of the characteristics 
of African economic development in comparative perspective is the failure industrialisation. 
 
In the following chapters of this I will chart the emergence of manufacturing in the 
developing world on a sector by sector basis, focusing on what activities went to which 
                                                 
9
 As prices of services have increased far more than those of industrial goods, the share of the service sector in 
constant prices has increased far less and the contribution to growth will also be less than when measured at 
current prices.  
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countries and regions and what were the drivers of these shifts. This will involve building up 
a statistical database of manufacturing sectors for a major sample of developing countries 
from 1950-2005, combining existing sources with new materials. I will focus on the push 
factors which caused industries to relocate to developing countries and the pull factors which 
explain why some countries were so much more successful in developing their manufacturing 
sectors than others. I will also discuss the general technological factors which contributed to 
the diffusion of manufacturing, as well as the technological factors specific to different 
industries. I will also pay attention to industrial and technology policies which distinguish 
successful from less successful industrialisers. 
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Annex Table 1: 
The Share of Manufacturing in GDP in Developing Countries, 1950-2005 
(Shares at current prices, 63 Countries) 
  1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Bangladesh (1) 7.2 9.8 5.3 5.4 5.8 7.0 13.8 14.2 13.1 15.3 15.2 16.5 
Cambodia     8.5 8.4         8.6 9.1 16.0 17.8 
China 14.1 16.8 31.3 29.2 33.7 38.1 40.5 34.9 32.9 33.7 32.1 33.5 
Hong Kong, China             22.8 21.3 16.7 7.7 5.4 3.4 
India 10.4 12.0 14.1 14.7 14.2 15.8 16.7 16.5 16.7 17.9 15.6 16.0 
Indonesia 7.4 9.8 9.2 8.4 10.3 9.8 13.0 16.0 20.7 24.1 27.7 27.7 
Iran, Islamic Rep.     9.5 8.7 10.1 7.3 7.8 7.2 11.8 11.9 13.2 11.8 
Iraq 6.1 7.0 9.6 8.9             0.9   
Jordan     6.2 11.9 11.3 8.9 12.7 11.5 14.9 15.1 15.7 18.2 
Lebanon 6.4     13.3           15.0 13.7 14.1 
Malaysia   11.2 8.1 9.5 12.4 17.6 21.6 19.3 24.2 26.4 32.6 29.8 
Pakistan (2) 7.2 9.8 12.1 14.5 16.1 16.7 15.9 15.9 17.4 16.3 14.7 18.6 
Philippines 8.5 13.1 20.3 19.5 24.9 25.7 25.7 25.2 24.8 23.0 22.2 23.3 
Republic of Korea 8.8 11.3 10.4 13.5 17.8 21.6 24.4 27.3 27.3 27.6 29.4 28.4 
Sri Lanka 4.2 5.9 15.4 16.8 16.7 20.1 17.7 14.7 14.8 15.7 16.8 14.8 
Syrian Arab Republic 7.2 8.3 9.0 8.3           6.4 5.9 8.5 
Taiwan 15.0 15.8 19.1 22.6 29.6 31.5 36.2 36.9 32.7 26.5 24.6 22.1 
Thailand 12.0 13.8 12.5 14.2 15.9 18.7 21.5 21.9 27.2 29.9 33.6 34.8 
Turkey 10.7 12.4 13.2 15.3 15.8 16.3 17.3 18.8 22.7 23.4 20.0 21.8 
Vietnam (3)     11.5 20.0       20.5 12.3 15.0 18.6 20.6 
                          
Argentina 23.4 30.4 32.2 33.8 31.5 38.2 29.5 29.6 26.8 18.4 17.5 23.2 
Barbados   12.7 8.0   7.9 10.3 11.9 10.6 10.1 10.1 6.4 7.1 
Bolivia   13.2 13.4 14.1 14.1 12.9 14.4 17.3 18.5 19.0 15.3 14.0 
Brazil 18.7 20.4 29.6 26.2 29.3 30.3 33.5 33.7 26.5 18.6 17.2 18.4 
Chile 17.1 19.3 24.9 26.1 25.9 20.4 21.5 16.2 19.6 18.1 19.5 15.7 
Colombia 12.9 14.9 16.5 19.7 21.2 23.7 23.9 22.0 20.6 15.9 15.8 16.4 
Costa Rica 10.3 11.4 16.2 16.6 18.2 20.4 18.6 25.1 22.6 21.8 25.3 21.8 
Dominican Republic 15.9 15.0 17.5 15.6 18.5 20.9 15.3 12.3 18.0 18.2 16.8 15.1 
Ecuador 15.7 15.0 15.6 18.5 17.6 16.4 19.5 19.1 19.2 14.0 13.6 8.9 
El Salvador     15.6 18.9 20.2 20.0 16.5 17.8 22.1 23.1 24.7 22.9 
Guatemala 12.0 12.2 12.8 14.1 15.8 15.1 16.6 15.8 15.1 14.1 13.2 18.7 
Guyana 15.2 13.5 10.4 13.1 12.1 14.7 12.1 13.9 10.3 11.4 8.2 7.7 
Honduras 8.6 8.7 12.5 12.4 13.8 15.7 15.0 14.5 16.3 17.8 22.7 20.9 
Jamaica 11.3 13.4 13.6 15.0         17.2 16.0 13.7 13.6 
Mexico 17.2 18.1 15.3 19.5 23.2 22.4 22.3 24.0 20.8 20.8 20.3 17.8 
Panama 11.3 9.8 12.8 15.3     11.0 12.3 9.7 9.1 10.1 8.0 
Paraguay 19.5 14.6 16.7 15.5 16.7 15.6 16.0 14.2 16.8 15.9 15.5 12.4 
Peru 14.5 15.4 20.2 17.1 19.8 20.0 20.0 25.2 17.8 16.8 15.8 16.3 
Puerto Rico 16.3 20.7 21.9 23.0 23.6 28.9 36.8 39.0 39.6 41.9 38.3   
Suriname   11.2 12.5 14.9   20.7 18.6 13.2 10.3 13.7 9.0 19.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 13.2 12.5 12.5 13.2       8.7 14.0 8.6 7.3 6.5 
Uruguay   19.4 21.2 24.4     25.4 29.4 28.0 19.7 16.9 22.5 
Venezuela, RB 10.9 11.7 10.7 16.6 16.1 15.7 16.0 18.9 14.9 15.1 19.8 17.9 
                          
Botswana       11.6 5.9 7.2 5.1 5.4 5.1 5.5 4.4 3.7 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 9.4 6.7   6.3 8.9   15.2 10.5 11.3 7.1 4.8 6.6 
Cote d'Ivoire     7.5 9.1 10.3 9.4 12.8 14.6 20.9 15.0 21.7 19.3 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 8.3   13.7     17.4 12.2 13.5 17.8 17.4 19.4 17.3 
Ethiopia (4)     6.0 6.7       4.3 4.8 4.8 5.5 4.8 
Ghana     5.1 9.8 11.4 13.9 7.8 11.5 9.8 9.3 9.0 8.7 
Kenya 10.8 9.6 9.4 11.5 12.0 12.0 12.8 11.7 11.7 9.9 11.6 11.7 
Libya     10.7 2.8 2.1 2.3 2.0 4.5 6.5       
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Malawi   4.8 5.4 6.9 11.3 13.1 13.7 14.5 19.5 15.8 12.9 13.9 
Mauritius 23.1 20.1 16.8 15.3   15.6 15.7 20.0 24.7 22.8 23.7 20.2 
Morocco 14.7 11.5 13.4 15.7 16.2 17.1 16.9 18.4 19.0 19.0 17.4 17.2 
Nigeria 1.8 3.0 3.8 5.4 3.7 5.0 8.4 8.7 5.5 5.4 3.7 4.6 
Sierra Leone   0.0 6.0 6.1 6.3 5.5 5.3 5.7 4.6 9.3 3.5 3.7 
South Africa 16.4 18.8 20.1 22.9 22.8 22.7 21.6 21.8 23.6 21.2 19.0 18.6 
Sudan   4.4 4.7 6.1 7.8 6.9 7.5 8.6 8.8 9.2 8.6 6.8 
Tanzania (5) 3.4 2.8 2.9 9.2     12.3   9.3 7.2 7.5 6.8 
Tunisia   9.9   8.1 8.4 9.1 11.8 15.1 16.9 19.0 18.2 17.4 
Uganda   7.9 8.5 8.4 9.2 6.3 4.3 5.8 5.7 6.8 9.8 9.3 
Zambia   3.4 4.0 7.9 12.1 17.5 19.2 20.6 26.5 11.7 11.4 11.5 
Zimbabwe/South Rhodesia   14.4 16.0 18.7 17.8 19.3 17.7 17.7 21.6 19.6 15.8 13.5 
                          
Average 20 Asian countries 8.9 11.2 12.5 13.8 16.8 18.2 20.5 20.1 19.9 19.0 18.7 20.1 
Average 23 Latin America 
countries 14.7 15.2 16.6 18.4 19.2 20.1 19.7 19.7 18.9 17.3 16.6 15.7 
Average 20 African countries 11.0 8.4 9.1 9.9 10.4 11.8 11.7 12.3 13.7 12.4 12.0 11.3 
                          
Average 63 Developing countries 11.9 12.2 13.1 14.3 15.5 16.8 17.2 17.3 17.5 16.3 15.9 15.7 
                          
Average 16 OECD countries 31.3 30.7 30.1 30.7 27.7 24.9 24.1 21.9 20.8 19.8 18.3 16.6 
Notes 
(1) Bangladesh, 50-60 shares for Pakistan including Bangladesh 
(2) Pakistan including Bangladesh till 1972. 
(3) South Vietnam till 1975, United Vietnam post 1975 
(4) prior to 1993 including Eritrea 
(5) till 1963 Tanganyika, exl. Zanzibar 
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Source Notes to Annex Table 1 
Developing countries, 1950-59: 
Unless otherwise specified: UN, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1957, 1962 and 
1967. We start with the 1967 dedition which provides data for 1953, 1955 and 1957-1966. 
Than we fill in the gaps with UN, 1962, with data for 1955-1961 and UN 1957 with data 
 
The following figures derive from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 10 sector 
database, http://www.ggdc.net/index-dseries.html, dowloaded april 2008: 
Taiwan and Thailand, 1951-1959; India, 1950-1959; Mexico, 1950-1959; South Korea, 1953-
1959; Colombia, 1950-1959.  
 
Indonesia 1950: Pierre van der Eng, The Sources of Long-term Economic Growth in 
Indonesia, 1880-2007, School of Management, Marketing and International Business, 
College of Business nad Economics, ANU, 4 July 2008, mimeo 
 
Brazil, 1950-59: IBGE - Diretoria de Pesquisas - Departamento de Contas Nacionais  
 
China, 1952-1959: China Statistical Yearbook , 2000, table 3-1. Shares probably based on net 
material product. No data on manufacturing, we applied the 1985 ratio of total manufacturing 
to total industry excl. construction (79.8%) to get a rough estimate for manufacturing. 
  
Turkey, NDP 1950 from OECD National Accounts, 1950-1968, microfiche edition, 1971. 
Manufacturing taken as 95% of the combined figure for mining and manufacturing 
 
Tanzania, 52-54 from Peacock and Dosser, The National Income of Tanganyika, 1952-54, 
London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1958. 
 
Egypt, 1952, South Africa, 1950/51 from UNSO, UN Statistical Yearbook: 
 
Developing Countries 1960-2005:  
Unless otherwise indicated World Bank, World Development Indicators Online, http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers, downloaded February 
2009. 
 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 10-sector database: Venezuela, 60-67;  
 
Share of manufacturing Tanzania, 1961, 1965, 1978, 1989 from Prins, I.M. and A. Szirmai, A 
Reconstruction of GDP and Employment in Tanzanian Manufacturing,1961-1995, Report to 
the Tanzanian Bureau of Statistics, Eindhoven, January, 1998 (147 pp.). I substituted my 
estimate for manufacturing 1965 for the UN, NA data and adjusted other sectors accordingly 
1960: Egypt, Ghana from World Tables, 1980, Washington, DC. 
 
Uruguay, 1994-2003, United Nations, National Accounts Statistics, Main Aggregates and 
Detailed Tables, Part III, 2005. 
  
Share of manufacturing Zambia 1964-1998 calculated directly from Zambian national 
accounts, rather than from WDI data which implausible shares for manufacturing. 
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The WDI shares for manufacturing from 1983-1993 are implausibly high, collapsing 
suddenly in 1994. For a detailed discussion of the sources see A. Szirmai, F. Yamfwa and Ch. 
Lwamba, 2002, Zambian Manufacturing Performance in Comparative Perspective,  
Groningen Growth and Development Centre Working Paper, GD 53). 
  
16 advanced OECD economies 
OECD, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953 unless otherwise specified from OECD, National Accounts, 
microfiche edition, 1971. 
 
Japan 1953-2004 from Groningen growth and development sector, 10 sector data base 
 
USA 1950-1987 from BEA, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp#Mid 
National Income and Product Accounts Table 
 
Austria, Belgium, 1960 from World Bank, World Tables 1976, Washington, D.C. 
 
OECD, 1970 from OECD Historical Statistics on line:OECD historical statistics http://oecd-
stats.ingenta.com/OECD/TableViewer/tableView.aspx 
 
Canada and Denmark, 1970 manufacturing value added, from: UNIDO Industrial 
StatisticsDatabase, INDSTAT 2000. For most other countries, the UNIDO manufacturing 
data are inconsistent with the WDI database, which derives from UN National Accounts and 
cannot be used to calculate manufacturing shares in GDP. 
 
From UN, Yearbook of National accounts Statistics, 1957, 1962, 1967, New York: 
Australia, 1953-65; Austria, 1950-66; Belgium, 1950-66; Canada, 1951-1959, 1961-66; 
Denmark, 1951-1959, 1961-65; Italy, 1950, 1952-9; Finland, 1951-66; France, 1951-59, 61-
66; Germany, West, 1953-59, 1961-66; Japan, 1950-51; Netherlands, 1951-59, 
61-66; Norway, 1952-59, 61-66; Sweden, 1953-59; 61-65; UK, 1951-59, 61-66;  
 
Netherlands, 1970-2005: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, EUKLEMS database, 
september 2008 
 
Sweden Sectoral shares 1980-92 from : Annual national accounts, aggregated, 1980-1993 
(publ. before 29-11-2007);http://www.scb.se/templates/Product____38421.asp 
  
From  UNIDO, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 2000, Geneva, table .1.4: 
Switserland, Share of manufacturing 1980; Australia, Share of manufacturing 1980,1985;   
Belgium, Share of manufacturing 1980, 1990;  Canada, Share of manufacturing 1980;  
France, Share of manufacturing 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995; West Germany, Share of 
manufacturing, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1996, 1997. 
  
Austria, 1950-75 manufacturing and mining combined. We applied 1976-2005 ratio for 
manufacturing/industry. This avoids overestimation of manufacturing share. 
 
Unless otherwise specified, all other data from WDI Online, accessed april 2008.  
 
If country data not available for given year, we used closest year in the range t-3 - t+3 
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For some countries and years only we only found data for industry. We used ratios of 
manufacturing to industry in the closest available year to estimate manufacturing shares. 
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